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Abstrat: We investigate the role of preferenes in the existene of expetation-driven
instability under a balaned budget rule where government spendings are naned by a
tax on labor inome. Considering a one-setor neolassial growth model with a large
lass of preferenes, we nd that expetation-driven utuations are more likely when
onsumption and labor are Edgeworth substitutes. Under this property, an intermedi-
ate range of tax rates and a suiently low elastiity of intertemporal substitution in
onsumption lead to instability. Numerial simulations of the model support the on-
lusion that labor inome taxation is a plausible soure of instability in most OECD
ountries.
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1. Introdution
During the Summer 2011, the European stok market downswing leads
poliy-makers to implement rules that aim to balane government budget. This
revival of balaned-budget rules an be understood as a mean to redue risks
of an exploding publi debt but also as a signal sent to the rating agenies that
publi nanes are kept sane. Indeed, in ountries faing a too large debt or
unontrolled publi aount, long-term growth may be rowded out and bor-
rowing on nanial market may be harder sine rising interest rates inreases
the burden of publi debt. This leads therefore to unsustainable situation as in
Greee, Spain or Portugal in the reent years. In this ontext, the European
Union enfores the European Fisal Compat.
Although an extensive literature addresses the question of sal rules through
its proylial eet, a key argument has been stressed in the seminal ontribu-
tion of Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe [21℄. They show that in a standard one-setor
Ramsey model with a onstant stream of wasteful government expenditures -
naned by a distortionary tax on labor inome, a balaned-budget rule may be
a soure of aggregate instability. Indeed, tax rates larger than the apital share
of inome and lower than the tax rate assoiated to the peak of the Laer urve
involve expetation-driven utuations. The mehanism behind instability re-
lies on the volatility of agents' expetations and goes as follows. An inrease in
the expeted tax rate implies a redution in future employment and therefore
of apital returns. Consequently, investment dereases and households need to
work less. The tax rate being dereasing in hours worked, the governement has
to inrease the tax rate to maintain the budget balaned and expetations are
therefore self-fullling.
Several ontributions extend this framework, but provide ontraditory on-
lusions. Ghilardi and Rossi [5℄ generalize the tehnology with a CES prodution
funtion assuming the same preferenes as Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe [21℄. They
show that instability is more likely when apital and labor are substitutes. In
onstrast, Linnemann [14℄ keeps a Cobb-Douglas tehnology, but onsiders a
partiular lass of non-separable preferenes and shows that instability is un-
likely. In this paper, we propose to reexamine the destabilizing eet of labor
inome taxation under a more general approah and emphasize partiularly the
role of preferenes. Our investigation is motivated by two points. On the one
hand, the role of preferenes in the ourene of indeterminay is a ornerstone
for several ontributions. For instane, Nishimura et al. [17℄ onsider the our-
rene of indeterminay in a model with aggregate externalities. They show that
the onditions for the emergene of instability strongly depend on the properties
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of preferenes, sine some partiular utility funtions are not ompatible with
indeterminay. On the other hand, there is a growing interest in the impat of
sal poliies in presene of spei preferenes, espeially when non-separable
utility funtions are assumed. The empirial investigation of Trabandt and Uh-
lig [22℄ examines the shapes of the Laer urve with linearly homogeneous and
King-Plosser-Rebelo [12℄ (KPR) preferenes. Bilbiie [2℄ investigates how non-
separability of preferenes explains the observed inrease in private onsumption
in response to sal shoks.
We examine the interplay between preferenes and tehnology on the exis-
tene of tax rates that generate indeterminay. This is explored in a neola-
ssial innite-horizon growth model embedding most popular preferenes used
by maroeonomists. We onsider three lasses of utility funtion: i) additively
separable preferenes with non-unitary elastiity of intertemporal substitution
in onsumption and elasti labor supply, ii) a linearly homogeneous utility fun-
tion, iii) a Jaimovih-Rebelo [9℄ (JR) formulation where the degree of inome
eet an be ontrolled and admits two polar ases. In absene of inome ef-
fet, a Greenwood-Herowitz-Human [7℄ (GHH) utility funtion is onsidered.
On the ontrary, with a maximized degree of inome eet, the preferenes are
haraterized by a King-Plosser-Rebelo [12℄ (KPR) formulation. A generalized
prodution funtion desribes the tehnology of the rms so as to enompass the
results of Ghilardi and Rossi [5℄ on inputs substitution. Governement setor is
nally haraterized by the same balaned-budget rule onsidered by Shmitt-
Grohé and Uribe [21℄ for whih the tax rate is ounter-ylial with respet to
the tax base.
Our general investigation identies a robust property to obtain indetermi-
nay. Indeed, we nd that indeterminay is more likely when the preferenes
exhibit Edgeworth substitutability between onsumption and labor, suh that a
marginal inrease in labor dereases the marginal utility of onsumption. This
property is always satised if the utility funtion is linearly homogeneous, but
requires a large enough degree of inome eet for JR preferenes. Furthermore,
with the three speiations we onsider, a low enough elastiity of intertempo-
ral substitution in onsumption is neessary to get indeterminay. Under these
properties, an intermediate range of tax rates is destabilizing. The intuition
behind our results omes from the fat that intertemporal and intratemporal
eets need to be in aordane. Coming bak to the intuition of Shmitt-
Grohé and Uribe desribed above, when households derease their labor supply
in urrent period, at the same time, they must derease their onsumption sine
they have less inome. However, this is only ompatible with a marginal util-
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ity of onsumption that is inreasing in leisure i.e. Edgeworth substitutability
between onsumption and labor.
Finally, we study the empirial robustness of the model. A alibrated version
of the model based on plausible estimates of strutural parameters emphasizes
that labor inome taxes under a balaned-budget rule are a potential soure
of instability for most OECD ountries. This onerns partiularly European
ountries sine they experiene the highest tax rates and stand within the range
of destabilizing tax rates for most of the alibrations onsidered.
In the next setion, we present the model and derive the optimal hoies of
households and rms. Setion 3 is devoted to prove the existene of a normalized
steady state. In Setion 4, we provide the dynami analysis with our main
results and a disussion with the related literature, while empirial illustrations
are given in Setion 5. Eonomi interpretations are disussed in Setion 6.
Finally, Appendix presents all the proofs.
2. The model
In this setion, we desribe our eonomy with a standard neolassial growth
model. First, we dene the poliy rule implemented by the government. Then,
we state how the agents hoose the amount of good onsumed and hours worked,
and nally, we desribe the tehnologial struture.
2.1. Government
Following Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe [21℄, we assume that the government
hooses a onstant level of publi spendingsG, that neither aet the preferenes
nor the tehnology. Sine the budget is balaned, it is equal to the total tax
revenue Ω(t) generated by a tax rate, τ(t), applied on labor inome, w(t)l(t),
with w(t) the wage rate and l(t) the labor supplied:
G = Ω(t) = τ(t)w(t)l(t) (1)
Equivalently, the balaned-budget rule an be written as:
τ(t) = Gw(t)l(t) (2)
Sine publi spendings are onstant, the tax rate is ounter-ylial with its tax
base, i.e. a derease in the labor inome ends up in an inrease in the tax rate.
1
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Giannitsarou [6℄ onsiders the same type of balaned-budget rule but fouses on onsump-
tion taxes.
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2.2. Households' behavior
We onsider an eonomy populated by a large number of idential innitely-
lived agents. We assume without loss of generality that the total population is
onstant and normalized to one. At eah period an agent supplies elastially
an amount of labor l ∈ [0, l¯], with l¯ > 1 his time endowment. He then derives
utility from onsumption c and leisure L = l¯− l aording to the instantaneous
utility funtion U(c,L/B), where B > 0 is a saling parameter, whih satises:
Assumption 1.U(c,L/B) is Cr over R++×(0, l¯) for r large enough, inreasing
with respet to eah argument and onave. Moreover,
UcL
Uc
L
B −
ULL
UL
L
B 6= 1,
limX→0XUX(c,X)/Uc(c,X) = 0 and limX→+∞XUX(c,X)/Uc(c,X) = +∞,
or limX→0XUX(c,X)/Uc(c,X) = +∞ and limX→+∞XUX(c,X)/Uc(C,X) =
0.
This assumption will ensure existene of a normalized steady state. In ad-
dition to these general properties, we introdue the denition of Edgeworth
substitutability between onsumption and labor:
Denition 1. If the marginal utility of onsumption is inreasing in leisure suh
that UcL(c,L/B) > 0, then onsumption and labor are Edgeworth substitutes.
Following Denition 1, Edgeworth omplementarity between onsumption
and labor is obviously obtained when UcL(c,L/B) < 0.
In our investigation, we will onsider three dierent speiations of
preferenes ommonly used in the literature:
i) An additively separable utility funtion
U(c, (l¯ − L)/B) =
c1−
1
εcc
1− 1εcc
−
((l¯ − L)/B)
1+ 1εll
1 + 1εll
(3)
where εcc is the elastiity of intertemporal substitution in onsumption and
εll is the inverse of the wage elastiity of labor. Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe
[21℄ onsider this formulation with εcc = 1 and εll = +∞. Obviously, these
preferenes exhibit neither Edgeworth substitutability nor omplementarity
sine UcL(c,L/B) = 0.
ii) A linear homogeneous utility funtion U(c,L/B) haraterized by the
share of onsumption within total utility α(c,L/B) ∈ (0, 1) dened by:
α(c,L/B) = Uc(c,L/B)cU(c,L/B)
(4)
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while the share of leisure is given by 1 − α(c,L/B). A partiular property
of these preferenes is that onsumption and labor are always Edgeworth
substitutes UcL(c,L/B) > 0.
iii) A Jaimovih-Rebelo [9℄ formulation suh that
U(c,L/B) =
(c+ (L/B)1+χcγ)1−θ
1− θ
(5)
with θ, χ > 0 and γ ∈ [0, 1]. These preferenes are haraterized by the
parameter γ that ontrols the degree of inome eet and enompass two
standard formulations. On the one hand, in absene of inome eet (γ = 0),
the GHH formulation is obtained and yields a labor supply independent of
onsumption. On the other hand, when the inome eet is the largest (γ = 1),
the utility funtion is a KPR formulation whih is ompatible with balaned
growth and stationnary hours worked. Aording to Denition 1, Edgeworth
substitutability between onsumption and labor requires γ > θ while Edgeworth
omplementarity is obtained when γ < θ. Linnemann [14℄ onsiders a partiular
restrition of this speiation assuming a KPR formulation with θ > 1 that
implies Edgeworth omplementarity.
Finally, all these utility funtions satisfy normality of onsumption and
labor. In addition, additively separable and linear homogeneous speiations
also satisfy onavity but this is not neessarily the ase with JR preferenes
when γ 6= 0 (see Setion 4.3 for further details).
The intertemporal maximization program of the representative agent is given
by:
max
c(t),l(t),K(t)
∫ +∞
t=0
e−ρtU
(
c(t), (l¯ − l(t))/B
)
s.t. c(t) + K˙(t) + δK(t) = r(t)K(t) + (1− τ(t))w(t)l(t)
K(0) > 0 given
(6)
where r(t) is the rental rate of apital, ρ > 0 the disount rate, K(t) the apital
stok and δ > 0 the depreiation rate of apital. Moreover, we assume in the
following that eah household onsiders as given the tax rate τ(t) on labor
inome.
Let us introdue the Hamiltonian in urrent value:
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H = U(c(t), (l¯ − l(t))/B) + λ(t)
[
r(t)K(t) + (1− τ(t))w(t)l(t) − c(t)− δK(t)
]
with λ(t) the shadow prie of apital K(t). Considering the pries (11)-(12) and
the tax rate τ(t) as given, we derive the following rst order onditions:
Uc(c(t), (l¯ − l(t))/B) = λ(t) (7)
(1/B)UL(c(t), (l¯ − l(t))/B) = λ(t)(1 − τ(t))w(t) (8)
λ˙(t) = −λ(t)[r(t) − ρ− δ] (9)
Any solution needs also to satisfy the transversality ondition:
lim
t→+∞
e−ρtλ(t)K(t) = 0
(10)
2.3. The prodution struture
Considering a ompetitive eonomy, a ontinuum of rms of unit size pro-
dues a single good Y using apital K and labor l. The rms' tehnology is
a onstant returns to sale prodution funtion Y = AF (K, l), with A > 0 a
saling parameter. We dene the intensive stok of apital a = K/l for any
l > 0 and the intensive prodution funtion writes Y/l = Af(a).
Assumption 2. f(a) is Cr over R++ for r large enough, inreasing (f
′(a) > 0)
and onave (f ′′(a) < 0).
From the prot maximisation of a rm, we obtain the wage rate w(t) and
the rental rate of apital r(t) as:
r(t) = Af ′(a(t)) (11)
w(t) = A[f(a(t))− a(t)f ′(a(t))] (12)
We also ompute the share of apital in total inome:
s(a) = af
′(a)
f(a) ∈ (0, 1) (13)
and the elastiity of apital-labor substitution:
σ(a) = − (1−s(a))f
′(a)
af ′′(a) > 0 (14)
Assumption 3. Capital and labor are suiently strong substitutes, suh that
σ(a) > s(a).
This last assumption implies that labor inome is inreasing with the quan-
tity of hours worked. Extending the analysis of Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe [21℄
who assume a Cobb-Douglas prodution funtion, Ghilardi and Rossi [5℄ also
study the impat of substitutability between apital and labor on the range
of destabilizing tax rates. However, we generalize both previous ontributions
they assume a logarithmi utility for onsumption and an innitely elasti labor
within additively-separable preferenes.
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2.4. Intertemporal equilibrium
In order to derive the intertemporal equilibrium, let
τ ≡ τ˜(K, l) = Gw(K(t)/l(t))l(t)
and substitute τ˜(K, l) and the wage rate (12) in the rst order onditions (7)
and (8). Given K and λ, the system obtained an be solved to express the
onsumption demand and labor supply funtions c(K(t), λ(t)) and l(K(t), λ(t)).
Plugging the latter in the expression of the tax rate, one obtains:
τ˜ (K(t), l(K(t), λ(t))) ≡ τ(K(t), λ(t)) (15)
Using (11)-(12), we get the equilibrium values for the rental rate of apital
r(t) and the wage rate w(t) with a(t) = K(t)/l(K(t), λ(t)):
r(t) = Af ′(a(t)) ≡ r(K(t), λ(t))
w(t) = A[f(a(t)) − a(t)f ′(a(t))] ≡ w(K(t), λ(t))
(16)
Substituting the expressions obtained for pries, tax rate, onsumption de-
mand and labor supply in the equation of apital aumulation (6) and in the
Euler equation (9), we obtain the following system of dierential equations in
K and λ:
K˙(t) = r(K(t), λ(t))K(t) + (1− τ(K(t), λ(t)))w(K(t), λ(t))l(K(t), λ(t))
− δK(t)− c(K(t), λ(t))
λ˙(t) = −λ(t) [r(K(t), λ(t)) − ρ− δ]
(17)
An intertemporal equilibrium is a path {K(t), λ(t)}t≥0, with K(0) > 0, that
satises equations (17) and the transversality ondition (10).
3. Normalized steady state
A steady state is a 4-tuple (a∗, l∗, c∗, τ∗), with a∗ = K∗/l∗, satisfying:
δ + ρ = Af ′(a∗) (18)
c∗ = l∗ [(Af ′(a∗)− δ)a∗ + (1− τ∗)A(f(a∗)− a∗f ′(a∗))](19)
UL(c
∗, (l¯ − l∗)/B)
BUc(c∗, (l¯ − l∗)/B)
= (1− τ∗)A[f(a∗)− a∗f ′(a∗)] (20)
τ∗ =
G
A[f(a∗)− a∗f ′(a∗)]l∗
(21)
We use the saling parameters A > 0 and B > 0 to ensure the existene of
a normalized steady state (NSS), a∗ = 1 and l∗ = 1, whih remains invariant
with respet to preferenes and tehnologial parameters.
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Proposition 1. Let Assumptions 1-2 hold. Then there exist unique values A∗
and B∗ suh that when A = A∗ and B = B∗, (a∗, l∗) = (1, 1) is a NSS.
Proof : See Appendix 8.1.
Remark : Using a ontinuity argument, we onlude from Proposition 1 that
there exists an intertemporal equilibrium for any initial apital stok K(0) in
the neighborhood of K∗.
Let us introdue the following elastiities:
εcc = −
Uc(c,L)
Ucc(c,L)c
, εlc = −
UL(c,L)
ULc(c,L)c
,
εcl = −
Uc(c,L)
UcL(c,L)l
, εll = −
UL(c,L)
ULL(c,L)l
(22)
Normality of onsumption and leisure states that
1
εcc
− 1εlc ≥ 0 and
1
εll
− 1εcl ≥ 0
and holds for any preferenes we onsider. Conavity of preferenes implies
1
εcc
1
εll
− 1εcl
1
εlc
≥ 0. This property is satised for both additive separable and
linear homogeneous preferenes. However, JR formulation requires further re-
stritions to satisfy onavity. Sine we are interested in the loal dynamis,
Lemma 2 in Setion 4.3 provides additionnal restritions to ensure onavity
in the neighboorhood of the steady state. Moreover, aording to Denition 1,
note that when
1
εcl
and
1
εlc
are negative (positive), onsumption and labor are
Edgeworth substitutes (omplements).
Finally, in the rest of the paper, we evaluate all the shares and elastii-
ties previously dened at the NSS. From (4), (13) and (14), we denote indeed
α(c∗, (l¯ − 1)/B∗) = α, s(1) = s and σ(1) = σ.
4. Instability with balaned-budget rules and labor inome taxes
This setion investigates the properties of preferenes that enhane the like-
lihood of indeterminay when a general tehnology is onsidered. In Appendix
8.2, we linearize the dynami system in the neighborhood of the NSS and om-
pute the trae and the determinant of the assoiated Jaobian matrix. As
the dynami system (17) has one predetermined and one forward variable, in-
determinay requires a negative trae and a positive determinant. From the
expression of the trae given in Appendix 8.2, we an diretly derive a nees-
sary ondition for the existene of indeterminay whatever the speiation of
preferenes:
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Lemma 1. Let Assumptions 1-3 hold. A neessary ondition for loal indeter-
minay of the NSS is τ > τ , with:
τ =
s
σ + εcc
(
1
εcc
1
εll
− 1εcl
1
εlc
)
1 + εcc
(
1
εcc
1
εll
− 1εcl
1
εlc
)
(23)
Proof: See Appendix 8.2
Given that the term
1
εcc
1
εll
− 1εcl
1
εlc
measures the degree of onavity of the
utility funtion, we onlude that stronger degrees of onavity imply that in-
determinay requires higher tax rates on labor inome. Lemma 1 therefore
underlines the importane of preferenes for the destabilizing impat of labor
inome taxes. Besides, a weak fator substitutability inreases the lower bound
on tax rate. This last point holds for any given speiation of preferenes and
is partiularly disussed in Ghilardi and Rossi [5℄ who onsider the restrited
ase of additively-separable preferenes with logarithmi utility funtion of on-
sumption and innitely elasti labor. Their related ondition is τ > sσ while, in
Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe's [21℄ framework with a Cobb-Douglas tehnology, it
beomes τ > s.
4.1. Additively separable preferenes
We rst fous on a generalized version of Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe [21℄
with an additively separable utility funtion. More preisely, we do not restrit
the elastiity of intertemporal substitution in onsumption or the elastiity of
apital-labor substitution to be unitary (i.e. εcc, σ 6= 1). Furthermore, labor
supply is assumed to be elasti suh that
1
εll
∈ (0,+∞). Note that this lass
of preferenes is haraterized by
1
εcl
= 1εlc = 0 meaning that onsumption and
labor are neither Edgeworth substitutes nor omplements. From Lemma 1, we
derive τ =
s/σ+ 1εll
1+ 1εll
and a rst result follows:
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1-3, let U(c,L/B) be given by (3) and
τ =
s/σ+ 1εll
1+ 1εll
. There exist ρ¯ ∈ (0,+∞], ε¯cc > 0 and τ¯ ∈ (τ , 1) suh that the NSS
is loally indeterminate if and only if ρ ∈ (0, ρ¯), εcc < ε¯cc and τ ∈ (τ , τ¯).
Proof: See Appendix 8.3.
This proposition highlights the existene of an interval of tax rates that leads
to indeterminay. On the one hand, the lower bound of this interval depends on
the apital share of inome s, the apital-labor elastiity of substitution σ and
the inverse of the wage elastiity of labor
1
εll
. It is straightforward to prove that
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τ is inreasing in 1εll . As a onsequene, innitely elasti labor (i.e.:
1
εll
= 0),
as onsidered in Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe [21℄ and Ghilardi and Rossi [5℄, is
the less restritive ase sine τ = sσ . To ensure that τ < τ¯ , the elastiity of
intertemporal substitution in onsumption has to be low enough. Namely, εcc
has to be lower than ε¯cc with:
ε¯cc =
(
1−s/σ
1+ 1εll
)
[(ρ+ δ) (1− s) + sρ]
s
σ
[(
1−s/σ
1+ 1εll
)
(ρ+ δ) (1− s) + sρ
]
It is worth pointing out that this upper bound is dereasing with
1
εll
. More
preisely, when
1
εll
= 0, ε¯cc is the largest. This argument reinfores the onlu-
sion of Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe [21℄ that within additively-separable preferen-
es, instability is more likely when the labor supply is innitely-elasti.
4.2. Linear homogeneous preferenes
A linear homogeneous speiation is haraterized by
1
εlc
, 1εcl < 0 suh that
onsumption and labor are always Edgeworth substitutes. Moreover, notie
that
1
εcc
1
εll
− 1εcl
1
εlc
= 0 and we obtain therefore from (23) τ = sσ . Looking for
onditions ensuring the existene of a ontinuum of equilibrium paths around
the steady state, we obtain the next proposition:
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1-3, let U(c,L/B) be linear homogeneous
and τ = sσ . There exist ρ¯ ∈ (0,+∞], τ¯ ∈ (τ , 1) and ε¯cc > 0 suh that the NSS
is loally indeterminate if and only if ρ ∈ (0, ρ¯), εcc < ε¯cc and τ ∈ (τ , τ¯).
Proof : See Appendix 8.4.
As in Proposition 2, we show that the equilibrium is loally indeterminate
for tax rates within a bounded interval. The lower bound on tax rates inreases
with the apital share of inome and dereases with the elastiity of apital-
labor substitution. Note that in order to have τ < τ¯ , we impose a low enough
elastiity of intertemporal substitution in onsumption suh that εcc < ε¯cc.
This ondition is equivalent to the one obtained in the additively separable
ase. Nevertheless, it is not restritive beause ε¯cc tends to +∞ when the
share of onsumption in total utility α tends to unity. Finally, the restrition
on the elastiity of intertemporal substitution in onsumption has important
impliations on the wage elastiity of labor. Indeed, ombining equations (35)
and (37) in Appendix 8.4, one shows that a suiently low εcc implies a low
enough wage elastiity of labor εll suh that εll < ε¯ll with:
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ε¯ll =
(1−α)[(ρ+δ)(1−s)+sρ]+α(1− sσ )(ρ+δ)(1−s)
α2 sσ (ρ+δ)(1−s)
(24)
This onlusion ontrasts therefore with Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe [21℄ and
Ghilardi and Rossi [5℄ that assume additively-separable preferenes but also
with Linnemann [14℄, that onsiders a partiular KPR utility funtion. All
these ontributions require a large enough wage elastiity of labor to obtain
indeterminay.
4.3. Jaimovih-Rebelo preferenes
With JR preferenes, we an ontrol the degree of the inome eet through
the parameter γ ∈ [0, 1]. It is worth stressing that these preferenes exhibits
Edgeworth substitutability between onsumption and labor if γ > θ and Edge-
worth omplementarity when γ < θ.
In order to ensure onavity in the neighborhood of the NSS, we add the
following restrition:
Lemma 2. Let U(c,L/B) be given by (5) and Assumption 1 holds. A neessary
and suient ondition to obtain onavity in the neighborhood of the NSS is
θ ≥ θ(τ, γ, χ) with:
θ(τ, γ, χ) =
γC(τ)(γ + χ)(1 + χ− (1− γ)C(τ))
(1 + χ)2[χ+ γC(τ)
(
2− (1−γ)C(τ)1+χ
)
]
Proof: See Appendix 8.5.
Contrary to the previous ases, it is not possible to derive from (23) an
expliit expression of τ sine it is impliitly given by τ = h(τ ) with:
h(τ) =
s
σ +
θ(1+χ)2
[
χ+γC(τ)
(
2− (1−γ)C(τ)1+χ
)]
−γC(τ)(γ+χ)[1+χ−(1−γ)C(τ)]
θ(1+χ)2−γ(1−γ)C(τ)[1+χ−(1−γ)C(τ)]
1 +
θ(1+χ)2
[
χ+γC(τ)
(
2− (1−γ)C(τ)1+χ
)]
−γC(τ)(γ+χ)[1+χ−(1−γ)C(τ)]
θ(1+χ)2−γ(1−γ)C(τ)[1+χ−(1−γ)C(τ)]
As shown in Appendix 8.6, there exists a unique τ ∈ (0, 1) suh that Lemma 1
holds. We get then the next proposition:
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1-3, let U(c,L/B) be given by (5). There
is a ritial value γ ∈ (0, 1) for whih for any given γ ∈ (γ, 1], there exist
ρ¯ ∈ (0,+∞], θ¯ ∈ (θ,+∞], σ ∈ (s,+∞), τ ∈ (0, 1) and τ¯ ∈ (τ , 1) suh that the
NSS is loally indeterminate if and only if ρ ∈ (0, ρ¯), θ ∈ (θ, θ¯), σ > σ and
τ ∈ (τ , τ¯).
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Proof: See Appendix 8.6.
This proposition, jointly with Propositions 2 and 3, highlights the robustness
of the existene of an intermediate range of destabilizing tax rates. Moreover,
a diret outome of Proposition 4 is that indeterminay is more likely when
onsumption and labor are Edgeworth substitutes. Indeed, we an show (see
Appendix 8.5) that γ is always larger than θ. As a result, Proposition 4
implies Edgeworth substitutability or weak omplementarity. More preisely,
loal indeterminay is ruled out with a GHH speiation haraterized by the
absene of inome eet (γ = 0) and a strong Edgeworth omplementarity.
On the ontrary, with KPR preferenes (γ = 1), onsumption and labor are
obviously Edgeworth substitutes if θ < 1. In this ase, the existene of a
range of destabilizing tax rates is ensured. Otherwise, when onsumption and
labor beome weak Edgeworth omplements, indeterminay may still hold
but requires higher tax rates. This onlusion explains therefore the result of
Linnemann [14℄ about the lak of plausibility of indeterminay sine he assumes
θ > 1, i.e. a strong Edgeworth omplementarity between onsumption and
labor.
We have highlighted the role of preferenes on the emergene of indetermi-
nay in a Ramsey model with a balaned-budget rule naned by a labor inome
tax. We nd that Edgeworth substitutability between onsumption and labor
and a low elastiity of intertemporal substitution in onsumption are ruial for
the existene of a range of destabilizing tax rates. Next setion is devoted to
ompare our onlusions to the related literature.
4.4. Comparison with the related literature
Shmitt-Grohé [20℄ and Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe [21℄ laim that there is a
lose orrespondene between indeterminay in models with produtive exter-
nalities and models with balaned-budget. We argue that this equivalene is not
a general property when one assumes non additively separable preferenes. The
ontribution of Nishimura et al. [17℄ onsiders the ourrene of indeterminay
in a model with small aggregate externalities. They also nd that indeterminay
requires an inreasing marginal utility of onsumption with respet to leisure,
i.e. UcL(c,L) > 0. Aording to Denition 1, this implies that onsumption
and labor are Edgeworth substitutes. Nevertheless, additively separable and
linear homogeneous preferenes display indeterminay provided that the elas-
tiity of intertemporal substitution in onsumption is suiently large. Sine in
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the ase of labor inome tax we require a low enough elastiity of intertemporal
substitution in onsumption to obtain indeterminay, the lose orrespondene
disussed by Shmitt-Grohé [21℄ does not hold.
The literature on balaned-budget rules has also foused on the destabilizing
role of onsumption taxes. Assuming an additive separable utility funtion, Gi-
annitsarou [6℄ show that onsumption tax has stabilizing eet sine saddle-path
stability is always ensured, ontrarily to Shmitt-Grohé and Uribe [21℄ with a la-
bor inome tax. However, Nourry et al. [18℄ disuss this onlusion onsidering
non-separable preferenes with varying inome eet. They nd that in pres-
ene of an intermediate or a low degree of inome eet, onsumption taxes lead
to instability. In other words, in ontrast to labor inome tax, the key element
for a destabilizing onsumption tax is Edgeworth omplementarity between on-
sumption and labor. It follows that even though onsumption and labor inome
taxes introdue similar distortions in the onsumption-leisure trade-o, they
require opposite properties of preferenes in order to be destabilizing.
In the next setion, we investigate the numerial properties of our results in
order to disuss their empirial plausibility.
5. Empirial illustration
To give better insights of our results, we proeed to a numerial exerise.
We rst divide ountries between four groups aording to the range of their
tax rates on labor inome. The lassiation is based on the ontribution of
Trabandt and Uhlig [22℄ that omputes the eetive tax rates up to 2008 using
the methodology of Mendoza et al. [15℄. The four groups of ountries are given
in Table 1.
τ ∈ (0.25, 0.30) Japan (0.27), U.S. (0.28), U.K. (0.28), Ireland (0.27)
τ ∈ (0.30, 0.40) Portugal (0.31), Spain (0.36)
τ ∈ (0.40, 0.50) Belgium (0.49), Denmark (0.47), EU-14 (0.41), Frane (0.46),
Germany (0.41), Italy (0.47), Netherland (0.44),
τ ∈ (0.50, 0.60) Austria (0.50), Sweden (0.56)
Table 1: Estimated labor inome tax rates
We need now to x the values of the strutural parameters. On the basis of
quarterly data, we onsider the benhmark values (ρ, δ, s) = (0.01, 0.025, 0.3).
Aording to the empirial literature, there is no lear agreement on the size of
the elastiity of apital-labor substitution. Nevertheless, the higher estimates of
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this elastiity stand in the interval (1.24, 3.24) as shown in Duy and Papageor-
giou [4℄ and Karagiannis et al. [10℄. There is also no onsensus on the elastiity
of intertemporal substitution in onsumption. Several ontributions provides
the range (0.2,0.8) (see Campbell [3℄ and Koherlakota [13℄), while Mulligan
[16℄ and more reently Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio [23℄ show evidenes for
higher estimates with an interval (2,3). Finally, many ontributions onsider
that labor is innitely elasti. However, Rogerson and Wallenius [19℄ investi-
gate aggregate partiipation in the labor market at the maro level and nd an
interval of the wage elastiity of labor that stands between 2.25 and 3.
From the disussion above, we fous on the following intervals for εcc ∈
[0.66, 2], εll ∈ [2.5,+∞]. We also assume σ ∈ [0.8, 1.4]. This interval allows to
onsider the estimates given by the empirial literature but also extend to the
ase of omplementarity between inputs sine the onlusions of the literature
are still unertain.
2
We rst alibrate an additively-separable utility funtion
haraterized by εcc = 0.67 and εll ∈ (2.85,+∞).
σ =0.8 σ =1.4
εll = +∞ (0.38,0.87) (0.21,0.87)
εll=2.86 (0.54,0.74) (0.42,0.74)
Table 2: Range of destabilizing tax rates (τ ,τ¯) with additively-separable preferenes
Table 2 reports the intervals of destabilizing tax rates in the additively-
separable ase. We observe that the lower bound τ is between 0.21 and 0.54
while the upper bound τ¯ is higher than 0.74. Aording to Table 1, this stresses
the plausibility of our results. Indeed, exept when σ = 0.8 and εll = 2.86,
most ountries in Europe are destabilized. This onerns partiularly Sweden,
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Frane. Moreover, the whole sample of
ountries stands inside the range of destabilizing tax rates when labor supply
is innitely elasti and the substitutability between apital and labor is strong
enough.
When the utility funtion is homogeneous linear, we alibrate the parameters
εcc = 0.66, α = 0.65 and εcc = 2, α = 0.51 in order to math an interval of
εll ∈ (2.5, 2.9) given the admissible values of τ in Table 1.
As shown in Table 3, the homogeneous linear formulation displays an even
better outline. The interval of τ beomes in this ase [0.21,0.38℄ and τ¯ is inside
2
Note that we assume a high enough elastiity of apital-labor substitution suh that
σ > (1− s) whih implies that apital inome is inreasing with respet to apital.
14
σ=0.8 σ=1.4
εcc=0.66, α=0.65 (0.38,0.97) (0.21,0.97)
εcc=2, α=0.51 (0.38,0.81) (0.21,0.81)
Table 3: Range of destabilizing tax rates (τ ,τ¯) with homogeneous linear preferenes
the interval (0.81,0.97). Consequently, all ountries with tax rates above 0.40
in Table 1 are now in the range of the destabilizing tax rates.
Finally, with the JR formulation, onsidering that the tax rates stands be-
tween (0.27,0.57) in Table 1, θ = 0.5 and χ = 0 math εll ∈ (2.3, 2.5). Figure 1
shows the lower and the upper bound on τ as a funtion of the degree of inome
eet γ.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
γ
τ
σ = 0.8, θ =0.5, χ =0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
γ
τ
σ = 1.4, θ =0.5, χ =0
Indeterminacy
Indeterminacy
Total
instability
Determinacy
DeterminacyDeterminacy
Determinacy
Total
instability
Figure 1: Destabilizing tax rates in the ase with Jaimovih-Rebelo preferenes. Dash lines:
τ , solid lines: τ¯
Under our alibration, Figure 1 shows that the minimum level of γ is in the
interval [0.51,0.63℄. Moreover, Table 4 reports the interval of γ for ountries
onsidered in Table 1 taking their tax rates as given.
γ ∈ (0.6, 0.75] Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Frane, Italy, Sweden
γ ∈ (0.8, 0.97] Germany, EU-14, Netherlands
γ ∈ (0.90, 0.94] Portugal, Spain
γ ∈ (0.95, 0.96] Japan, U.S., U.K., Ireland
Table 4: Instability with Jaimovih-Rebelo preferenes
This shows that a large range of values of γ overs indeterminate tax rates.
Furthermore, the intervals given in Table 4 ts the upper estimates of Kahn and
Tsoukalas [11℄. Using Bayesian estimations, they report a distribution of γ with
mean 0.81 and a 10-90 perentiles interval of [0.69,0.95℄. Our numerial exerise
illustrates therefore that most OECD ountries may experiene instability for
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plausible values of strutural parameters.
6. Eonomi intuition
To understand the eonomi mehanisms, let us assume that agents expet a
larger future tax rate. Following (8) and (11), future labor supply dereases and
yields a lower interest rate that redues inome in future period. Consequently,
investment dereases and sine they need to work less, households derease
their labor supply in urrent period. The derease in the tax base fores the
governement to adjust the budget by inreasing tax rates suh that volatility in
agent's expetations are self-fullling. Nevertheless one question remains: why
indeterminay ours under some lass of preferenes while it is ruled out with
others ? A ruial point to understand our results omes from the fat that
the ross-elastiity εlc needs to be negative or weakly positive, i.e. onsumption
and labor need to be Edgeworth substitutes or weak Edgeworth omplements.
In our interpretation, the derease in interest rate involves λ˙ > 0 sine r <
δ + ρ. Indeterminay is obtained if it is assoiated with a derease of labor
supply in urrent period that is larger than the derease of labor supply in the
next period.
3
Beause they have less inome in present period, they must also
derease their urrent onsumption. Self-fullling expetations implies therefore
c˙
c > 0 and
l˙
l > 0. Sine apital is predetermined, we have
w˙
w = −
s
σ
l˙
l . Taking
then the derivative of equation (8) with respet to time, indeterminay ours
if the following equality is satised:
(
s
σ
+
1
εll
)
l˙
l
−
1
εlc
c˙
c
=
λ˙
λ
(25)
Beause ( sσ+
1
εll
) is positive, this equation is satised if 1εlc is negative or positive
but suiently low suh that the rst term on the left-hand side dominates the
seond one. It is straightforward to show it is always the ase for an additively
separable and a linear homogeneous preferenes sine
1
εlc
= 0 in the former and
1
εlc
< 0 in the latter.
In the ase of Jaimovih-Rebelo preferenes, the sign of
1
εlc
is ambiguous and
depends on the size of τ , γ:
1
εlc
=
(θ − γ)(1 + χ) + γ(1− γ)C(τ)
1 + χ− (1 − γ)C(τ)
(26)
3
This allows to onstrut a stable dynami path that explains indeterminay.
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with C′(τ) < 0.
The denominator in equation (26) being positive, the sign of
1
εlc
is given
by the numerator. Consider rst that γ > θ. Sine C′(τ) < 0, the numerator
of (26) is negative for a large enough τ . Consequently, JR preferenes display
Edgeworth substitutability and equation (25) is always satised. In ontrast,
when γ < θ, the numerator is positive and onsumption and labor are therefore
Edgeworth omplement. It follows that the intertemporal mehanisms desribed
in equation (25) is less likely to be satised and therefore requires muh higher
tax rates to obtain self-fullling expetations.
7. Conluding omments
This paper ontributes to the debate dealing with the (de-)stabilizing prop-
erties of balaned-budget rules naned by a labor inome tax. More parti-
ularly, we emphasize the mehanisms in preferenes leading to indeterminay.
Fousing on three ommonly used utility funtions, we prove that Edgeworth
substitutability between onsumption and labor inreases the likelihood of a
destabilizing labor inome tax. When the elastiity of intertemporal substitu-
tion in onsumption is suiently low, an intermediate range of tax rates is
destabilizing. Finally, a numerial exerise supports our ndings aording to
the empirial evidene underlying the plausibility of balaned-budget rule as a
soure of instability in most OECD ountries.
8. Appendix
8.1. Proof of Proposition 1
To establish the existene of a normalized steady state (a∗, l∗, c∗, τ∗) =
(1, 1, c∗, τ∗), we have to prove the existene and uniqueness of solutions A∗
and B∗ satisfying:
δ + ρ = A∗f ′(1) (27)
τ∗ =
G
A∗[f(1)− f ′(1)]
(28)
c∗ = (1− τ∗)A∗[f(1)− f ′(1)] +A∗f ′(1)− δ (29)
UL(c, (l¯ − 1)/B
∗)
B∗Uc(c, (l¯ − 1)/B∗)
= (1− τ∗)A∗[f(1)− f ′(1)] (30)
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From equation (27), we derive that A∗ = ρ+δf ′(1) whih gives, one substituted
in equations (28) and (29), a unique τ∗ and c∗ rewritten as:
τ∗ = s(1)G(ρ+δ)(1−s(1))
c∗ = s(1)ρ+(1−τ)(ρ+δ)(1−s(1))s(1)
Considering A∗, τ∗ and c∗, we get the following equation from (30):
g˜(B) ≡ UL(c,(l¯−1)/B)
BUc(c,(l¯−1)/B)
= (1−τ
∗)(ρ+δ)(1−s(1))
s(1) (31)
Existene of a unique value B∗ satisfying equation (31) requires that the
marginal rate of substitution g˜(B) does not have a derivative equal to zero
and satises appropriate boundaries onditions. Sine under Assumption
1, limB→0 g˜(B) = 0 and limB→+∞ g˜(B) = +∞, or limB→0 g˜(B) = +∞
and limB→+∞ g˜(B) = 0, the existene of B
∗
is guaranteed. Moreover, as
Bg˜′(B)/g˜(B) 6= 0, uniqueness of B∗ also follows.
8.2. Proof of Lemma 1
To provide an analysis of loal stability, we linearize (17) around the NSS.
We then derive the harateristi polynomial by onsidering the elastiities eval-
uated at the NSS. We need rst to derive a relationship between the ross-
elastiities, εcl and εlc. Using (22) and the rst order onditions (7) and (8),
we get εcl =
(1−τ)wL
c εlc. Using the expression of w at the NSS given in (16)
together with (13) and (18) we nd wL = K(1 − s)(δ + ρ)/s. Sine at NSS,
c = l[ρa+ (1− τ)w], it follows:
εcl =
(1−τ)(δ+ρ)(1−s)+sρ
(1−τ)(δ+ρ)(1−s) εlc (32)
Dierentiating τ(K(t), λ(t)) as given by (15), one obtains the elastiities of
the tax rate with respet to K and λ:
ετk =
dτ
dK
K
τ = −
(1−τ)s
σ
[σ∆εcc+σ−s]
(1−τ)σ∆εcc+τ(s−σ)
ετλ =
dτ
dλ
λ
τ = −
(1−τ)(σ−s)εcc
(1−τ)σ∆εcc+τ(s−σ)
(
1
εcc
− 1εlc
)
Using (22), the Impliit Funtion Theorem gives the partial derivatives of
the funtions c(K(t), λ(t)) and l(K(t), λ(t)) evaluated at the NSS:
dc
dK =
c
K∆εcl
(
s
σ −
τετk
1−τ
)
, dcdλ = −
c
λ∆
[
1
εll
− (1 − τετλ1−τ )
1
εcl
+ sσ
]
dl
dK =
l
K∆εcc
(
s
σ −
τετk
1−τ
)
, dldλ =
l
λ∆
[
(1− τετλ1−τ )
1
εcc
− 1εlc
]
with ∆ = 1εcc
(
1
εll
+ sσ
)
− 1εclεlc . From these results and (16) we also derive at
the NSS:
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dr
dK = −
r(1−s)
Kσ
[
1− 1∆εcc
(
s
σ −
τετk
1−τ
)]
, drdλ =
r(1−s)
λ∆σ
[
(1− τετλ1−τ )
1
εcc
− 1εlc
]
dw
dK =
ws
Kσ
[
1− 1∆εcc
(
s
σ −
τετk
1−τ
)]
, dwdλ = −
ws
λ∆σ
[
(1 − τετλ1−τ )
1
εcc
− 1εlc
]
Linearizing the system (17) around the NSS, using (32) and the above results,
gives:
dK˙
dK = ρ−
(δ+ρ)(1−s)
s
{
τ
[
ετk +
s
σ
[
1− 1∆εcc (
s
σ −
τετk
1−τ )
]]
− 1−τ∆εcc (
s
σ −
τετk
1−τ )
}
− (1−τ)(1−s)(δ+ρ)s∆εcl (
s
σ −
τετk
1−τ )
dK˙
dλ =
(1−τ)(1−s)(δ+ρ)K
s∆λ
[
1
εll
+ sσ −
(
1− τετλ1−τ
)
1
εcl
]
+ (1− τ)
[(
1− τετλ1−τ
)
1
εcc
− 1εlc
]
+ (δ+ρ)(1−s)Ksλ
{
τ
[
∆ετλ −
s
σ
[
(1 − τετλ1−τ )
1
εcc
− 1εlc
]]}
dλ˙
dK = −
λ(δ+ρ)(1−s)
Kσ
[
∆+ 1∆εcc
(
s
σ −
τετk
1−τ
)]
dλ˙
dλ = −
(δ+ρ)(1−s)
∆σ
[
(1− τετλ1−τ )
1
εcc
− 1εlc
]
After tedious omputations and straightforward simpliations, using (32), the
expressions of ετk, ετλ as given above, we get the following harateristi poly-
nomial:
P(λ) = λ2 − T λ+D = 0 (33)
with
T = ρ− (ρ+δ)(1−s)τ
στ−s−(1−τ)σεcc[
1
εcc
1
εll
− 1εcl
1
εlc
]
and
D =
(ρ+δ)(1−s)εcc
[
[(1−τ)(ρ+δ)(1−s)+sρ]
[
(1−τ)
(
1
εcc
− 1εlc
+ 1εll
− 1εcl
)
−τ
]
+τ(1−τ)(ρ+δ)(1−s)
(
1
εcc
− 1εlc
)]
sσ
[
στ−s−(1−τ)σεcc[
1
εcc
1
εll
− 1εcl
1
εlc
]
]
where T and D are respetively the trae and the determinant of the assoiated
Jaobian matrix. Loal indeterminay requires T < 0 and D > 0. A neessary
ondition to have a negative trae is τ > τ with:
τ =
s
σ + εcc
(
1
εcc
1
εll
− 1εcl
1
εlc
)
1 + εcc
(
1
εcc
1
εll
− 1εcl
1
εlc
)
8.3. Proof of Proposition 2
In the ase of additively separable preferenes, the expression of the trae
is:
T = ρ−
τ(ρ+ δ)(1 − s)
στ − s− (1−τ)σχεll
Following Lemma 1, we derive diretly the lower bound on τ :
τ =
s
σ +
1
εll
1 + 1εll
(34)
19
Moreover, in order to ensure a negative trae, we also need the following ex-
pression to be satised:
ρ(στ − s− (
1− τ)σ
εll
)− (ρ+ δ)(1 − s)τ > 0
This leads to an upper bound on ρ suh that:
i) ρ < ρ¯ = δ(1−s)τ
στ−s− (1−τ)σεll
−s−(ρ+δ)(1−s)τ)
if στ − s− (1−τ)σεll − (ρ+ δ)(1 − s)τ) > 0
ii) ρ ∈ (0,+∞) ,otherwise
Considering the determinant, we get the following expression:
D = (δ+ρ)(1−s)
σs
(
στ−s− (1−τ)σεll
)P (τ)
where
P (τ) =
[
sρ+ (δ + ρ)(1− s)
]( 1
εcc
+
1
εll
)
−τ
[[
sρ+ (δ + ρ)(1 − s)
]( 1
εcc
+
1
εll
)
+
(ρ+ δ)(1− s)
εll
+sρ+ (δ + ρ)(1− s)
]
+ τ2(1− s)(ρ+ δ)(1 +
1
εll
)
The denominator of D is positive when τ > τ . Consequently, the sign of the
determinant is given by the sign of P (τ). The latter funtion is positive when
τ = 0 while negative when τ = 1. Sine P (τ) is stritly dereasing in τ ∈ (0, 1),
there exists therefore a unique τ¯ ∈ (0, 1) suh that P (τ) > 0 when τ < τ¯ . The
ondition τ ∈ (τ , τ¯ ) implies therefore a positive determinant.
Finally, we need to ensure that τ < τ¯ . This is the ase if and only if P (τ)
evaluated at τ is positive. After some simpliations, we derive:
P (τ ) =
(
1−s/σ
1+ 1εll
)
[(ρ+ δ) (1− s) + sρ] 1εcc
− sσ
[(
1−s/σ
1+ 1εll
)
(ρ+ δ) (1− s) + sρ
]
> 0
whih is satised if and only if εcc < ε¯cc with:
ε¯cc =
(
1−s/σ
1+ 1εll
)
[(ρ+ δ) (1− s) + sρ]
s
σ
[(
1−s/σ
1+ 1εll
)
(ρ+ δ) (1− s) + sρ
]
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8.4. Proof of Proposition 3
Note that with linear homogeneity, all the preferenes elastiities are written
as funtion of εcc suh that
εlc = −εcc
(1−α)
α , εcl = −εcc
(1−α)
α
(1−τ)(δ+ρ)(1−s)+sρ
(1−τ)(1−s)(ρ+δ) ,
εll = εcc
(1−α)2[(1−τ)(ρ+δ)(1−s)+sρ)
α2(1−τ)(ρ+δ)(1−s)
(35)
Sine linear homogeneity yields
1
εccεll
− 1εlcεcl = 0, the lower bound on tax
rate is given from (23) by:
τ =
s
σ
(36)
Under this ondition, we onlude that T < 0 when:
i) ρ < ρ¯ = δ(1−s)τστ−s−(1−s)τ if στ − s− (1 − s)τ > 0
ii) ρ ∈ (0,+∞) otherwise
Considering D and using the expressions in (35), the determinant is written:
D = (1−τ)(δ+ρ)(1−s)(1−α)sσ(στ−s) P (τ)
with
P (τ) = [(ρ+ δ)(1− s) + sρ] + α1−α (1− τ)(ρ+ δ)(1− s)
− τ [(1−τ)(ρ+δ)(1−s)+sρ](1−α)εcc(1−τ)
Moreover, we derive:
∂P (τ)
∂τ
= −
α
1− α
(ρ+ δ)(1 − s)−
(1− α)εcc
(1− τ)2
[(1− τ)2(ρ+ δ)(1 − s) + sρ] < 0
The polynomial P (τ) is positive when τ = 0 and negative when τ = 1. Sine
P (τ) is monotonially dereasing in τ , there exists therefore a unique solution
τ¯ ∈ (0, 1) suh that P (τ) > 0 if τ < τ¯ . Sine the denominator is positive when
τ > τ , the determinant is positive if and only if τ ∈ (τ , τ¯ ).
Finally, the ondition τ < τ¯ has to be ensured. Substituting τ = sσ into
P (τ), the interval (τ , τ¯) is non-empty if and only if P (τ ) > 0, i.e. εcc is low
enough suh that:
εcc < ε¯cc =
(1−s/σ)[(ρ+δ)(1−s)+sρ+(1−s/σ)(ρ+δ)(1−s) α
(1−α)
]
(1−α) sσ [(1−s/σ)(ρ+δ)(1−s)+sρ]
(37)
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8.5. Proof of Lemma 2
In the ase of Jaimovih-Rebelo preferenes, the elastiities in (22) write:
1
εcc
= θ
c−γ
(l/B)1+χ
1+χ c
γ
c− (l/B)
1+χ
1+χ c
γ
− γ(1− γ)
(l/B)1+χ
1+χ c
γ
c−γ (l/B)
1+χ
1+χ c
γ
, 1εll = θ
(l/B)1+χ
1+χ c
γ
c− (l/B)
1+χ
1+χ c
γ
+ χ,
1
εcl
=
(l/B)1+χ
1+χ c
γ
c−γ (l/B)
1+χ
1+χ c
γ
[
θ
c−γ (l/B)
1+χ
1+χ c
γ
c− (l/B)
1+χ
1+χ c
γ
− γ
]
, 1εlc = θ
c−γ (l/B)
1+χ
1+χ c
γ
c− (l/B)
1+χ
1+χ c
γ
− γ,
(38)
Using these expressions and the relationship between εcl and εlc at NSS
given by equation (32), one derives:
(l/B)1+χ
1+χ c
γ−1
1− γ (l/B)
1+χ
1+χ c
γ−1
=
(1− τ)(ρ + δ)(1− s)
(1− τ)(ρ + δ)(1 − s) + sρ
.
Let C(τ) = (1−τ)(ρ+δ)(1−s)(1−τ)(ρ+δ)(1−s)+sρ and solve the previous equation suh that:
(l/B)1+χ
1 + χ
cγ−1 =
C(τ)(1 + χ)
1 + χ+ γC(τ)
Then, the following expressions holds:
c−γ (l/B)
1+χ
1+χ c
γ
c− (l/B)
1+χ
1+χ
cγ
= 1+χ1+χ−(1−γ)C(τ) ,
(l/B)1+χ
1+χ c
γ
c−γ (l/B)
1+χ
1+χ
cγ
= (1+χ)C(τ)1+χ−(1−γ)C(τ)
The elastiities rewrite therefore:
1
εcc
= θ 1+χ1+χ−(1−γ)C(τ) − γ(1− γ)
C(τ)
1+χ ,
1
εll
= θ (1+χ)C(τ)1+χ−(1−γ)C(τ) + χ,
1
εlc
= θ 1+χ1+χ−(1−γ)C(τ) − γ,
1
εcl
= C(τ)εlc ,
(39)
Aording to this, loal onavity of the utility funtion is ensured when
1
εcc
≥ 0
and
1
εcc
1
εll
− 1εcl
1
εlc
≥ 0. Straighforward omputations show that these two
inequalities are satised if and only if:
θ ≥ θ(τ, γ, χ) ≡
γC(τ)(γ + χ)(1 + χ− (1− γ)C(τ))
(1 + χ)2[χ+ γC(τ)
(
2− (1−γ)C(τ)1+χ
)
]
(40)
Finally, note that Edgeworth substitutability holds if γ ≥ θ(τ, γ, χ). This
inequality is satised when γ = 0 and γ = 1. It follows that it will be satised
for any γ ∈ (0, 1) if 1 ≥ θ˜(τ, γ, χ) with :
θ˜(τ, γ, χ) =
C(τ)(γ + χ)(1 + χ− (1− γ)C(τ))
(1 + χ)2[χ+ γC(τ)
(
2− (1−γ)C(τ)1+χ
)
]
Straightforward omputations show that θ˜(τ, γ, χ) ∈ (0, 1) for any γ ∈ (0, 1).
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8.6. Proof of Proposition 4
Using the general expressions for the Trae and the Determinant, we obtain
with JR preferenes:
T = ρ− (ρ+δ)(1−s)τ
στ−s−(1−τ)σεcc
[
1
εcc
1
εll
− 1εcl
1
εlc
]
and
D =
(ρ+δ)(1−s)εcc
[
γ(1−τ)[1+χ−(1−γ)C(τ)]
1+χ [(ρ+δ)(1−s)+sρ]+[(1−τ)(ρ+δ)(1−s)+sρ][γ(1−τ)C(τ)+χ−τ(1+χ)]
]
sσ
[
στ−s−(1−τ)σεcc
[
1
εcc
1
εll
− 1εcl
1
εlc
]]
with
εcc
[
1
εcc
1
εll
− 1εcl
1
εlc
]
=
θ(1+χ)2
[
χ+γC(τ)
(
2−
(1−γ)C(τ)
1+χ
)]
−γC(τ)(γ+χ)[1+χ−(1−γ)C(τ)]
θ(1+χ)2−γ(1−γ)C(τ)[1+χ−(1−γ)C(τ)]
Considering γ = 0 (GHH ase), the trae and the determinant are given by:
T = ρ−
τ(ρ+ δ)(1 − s)
στ − s− (1− τ)σχ
(41)
D =
(δ + ρ)(1− s)εcc[(1 − τ)(ρ+ δ)(1 − s) + sρ]
σs[στ − s− σ(1− τ)χ]
[
χ− τ(1 + χ)
]
(42)
From (41), a neessary ondition to obtain a negative trae is that the tax
rate is suiently large suh that τ > τ0 with:
τ0 =
s
σ + χ
(1 + χ)
In equation (42), the ondition τ > τ0 implies a positive denominator. The
sign of the determinant is therefore determined by the seond fator of (42), i.e.
χ− τ(1 + χ). This expression is positive if and only if τ < τ¯0 with:
τ¯0 =
χ
1 + χ
whih is lower than τ0. Sine τ¯0 < τ0, it is not possible to obtain simultaneously
a negative trae and a positive determinant. Indeterminay is therefore ruled
out.
When we onsider γ = 1 (KPR ase), the trae and the determinant beome:
T = ρ− (ρ+δ)(1−s)τσG(τ)
and
D = (ρ+δ)(1−s)εccsσG(τ) P (τ)
with
G(τ) = τ − sσ − (1− τ)χ − (1− τ)C(τ)(2 −
1
θ )
23
and
P (τ) = [(1− τ)(ρ + δ)(1− s) + sρ]
[
χ− τ(1 + χ)
]
+(1− τ)2(ρ+ δ)(1 − s) + (1− τ)[(ρ + δ)(1− s) + sρ]
Indeterminay is obtained if and only if both G(τ) and P (τ) are positive.
In order to impose G(τ) >0, one an use Lemma 1. Yet, a lower bound τ1
as given in (23) is not anymore expliit but is impliitly given by τ1 = h(τ1)
with:
h(τ) =
s
σ + χ+ (2−
1
θ )C(τ)
1 + χ+ (2− 1θ )C(τ)
(43)
One derives that h(0) > 0 while h(1) =
s
σ+χ
1+χ < 1. There exists therefore
τ1 ∈ (0, 1) suh that G(τ) > 0 if and only if τ>τ1. Moreover, beause of the
polynomial form of G(τ), τ1 is unique.
Considering the expression of the trae, we diretly observe that when ρ
tends to zero, the trae is negative if τ > τ1. There exists therefore ρ¯1 > 0 suh
that T < 0 if and only if τ > τ1 and ρ ∈ (0, ρ¯1).
For the determinant, P (τ) is positive when τ = 0 and negative when τ = 1.
Sine P (τ) is stritly dereasing in τ ∈ (0, 1), there exists therefore a unique
τ¯1 ∈ (0, 1) suh that P (τ)>0 if and only if τ < τ¯1. The determinant is therefore
positive if and only if τ ∈ (τ1, τ¯1).
The ondition τ1 < τ¯1 has still to be fullled and is satised if and only if
P (τ1) > 0. First, note that substituting equation θ = θ1 ≡ θ(τ, 1, χ) in (43),
one derives:
τ1 =
s
σ
When P(τ) is evaluated at τ = sσ , one obtains:
P ( sσ ) = [(1−
s
σ )(ρ+ δ)(1− s) + sρ][χ−
s
σ (1 + χ)] + (1−
s
σ )
2(ρ+ δ)(1− s)
+(1− sσ )[(ρ+ δ)(1− s) + sρ]
On the one hand, if σ=s, we get P ( sσ ) = −sρ < 0. On the other hand, when
σ tends to +∞, P ( sσ ) is positive. There exist therefore σ
1 ∈ (s,+∞) suh that
τ1 < τ¯1 if and only if θ = θ1 and σ > σ1. By a ontinuity argument, there
exists therefore θ¯1 ∈ (θ1,+∞] and σ1 ∈ (s,+∞) suh that τ1 < τ¯1 if and only
if θ ∈ [θ1, θ¯1) and σ > σ1.
Given that indeterminay ours when γ = 1, τ ∈ (τ1, τ¯1), θ ∈ [θ1, θ¯1), ρ ∈
(0, ρ¯1) and σ>σ1 but is ruled out when γ = 0, there exists therefore γ ∈ (0, 1)
suh that for any γ ∈ (γ, 1], there exists τ ∈ (0, 1), τ¯ ∈ (τ , 1), ρ¯ ∈ (0,+∞],
θ¯ ∈ (θ,+∞] and σ ∈ (s,+∞) suh that the NSS is loally indeterminate if and
only if τ ∈ (τ , τ¯ ), θ ∈ [θ, θ¯), ρ ∈ (0, ρ¯) and σ>σ.
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